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Abstract. Low-quality products may cause consumer harm. A firm can reduce the proba-
bility of low quality through ex ante investment before sales, and can take remedy actions
such as product recalls if it learns after sales that product quality is low. An increase
in product liability increases the firm’s incentive for ex post remedy. More ex post rem-
edy, however, may have the "substitution effect" of reducing the firm’s ex ante quality
investment. On the other hand, more ex post remedy has the "output effect" of increasing
consumer demand for the product, and hence greater return to ex ante investment. The
trade-off between these two effects can lead to an inverted U-shaped relationship between
ex ante investment and product liability. We find that the firm always prefers full liability
whereas consumers might be better off with less than full liability. Full product liability
tends to be socially optimal when the potential consumer loss from low quality is sufficiently
high; otherwise partial liability can be socially optimal.
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1. INTRODUCTION
If the use of a firm’s product results in consumer harm due to poor product quality,
what should be the firm’s liability? Under the rule of full liability, the firm is required to
fully compensate the consumer for the harm; whereas under the rule of partial liability,
the compensation to the consumer is lower than the consumer’s loss. There have been
substantial interests in the product liability issue in law and economics, primarily because
liability rules can have important impacts on firm incentives and economic efficiency. One
literature has focused on the effects of product liability on a firm’s incentives for ex ante
actions. Liability rules can affect a firm’s precaution to ensure product safety (Simon, 1981)
or its quality choice (Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983). In addition to product quality choice,
product liability also affects a firm’s incentive to disclose quality information through price
and other devices (Daughety and Reinganum, 1995; 2008a; 2008b).1
With a different focus, another literature has studied the effects of product liability on
a firm’s incentives for ex post actions. Welling (1991) shows that a firm makes recalls in
order to build its reputation in the market, whereas Marino (1997) argues that mandatory
recalls motivate firms to increase product safety before sales. Spier (2009) analyzes a firm’s
incentives to buyback unsafe products and finds that the firm offers a lower buyback price
than socially desired. Hua (2009) compares strict liability to negligence rules when a firm’s
recall not only depends on its own costs/liability but also on consumers’ return incentives.2
In practice, changes in product liability can affect both firms’ ex ante investment action
and ex post actions such as product recalls. For example, in 2008, the US Senate discussed a
bill which would give the Consumer Product Safety Commission more power to collect and
disclose allegations of injuries. The supporters claimed that the bill would encourage firms
to design safer products. However, some other people argued that the bill would increase
1Furthermore, in relation to product liability, a firm’s choices between settlement and litigation and be-
tween confidential and open settlement may also affect its ex-ante quality choice (Daughety and Reinganum,
2005; 2006).
2For empirical work related to product recalls, see, for example, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Hartman
(1987), Hoffer, Rruitt, and Reilly (1988), and Rupp and Taylor (2002).
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firms’ liabilities too much, which might cause more product recalls but also more violations
of safety regulations (less safe products).3 These debates are related to the more general
question: what is the relationship between firms’ ex ante investment in product safety and
ex post remedies such as product recalls? Would larger product liability motivate firms
to increase or decrease ex ante investment before sales? Also, in the automobile industry,
manufactures could spend more time in safety design, which typically delays the marketing
of new models. Alternatively, they could reduce the delay and ex ante investment, but
collect further data and modify the design after sales.4
In this paper, we bridge and extend the two literatures by analyzing the potential effects
of product liability on both ex ante quality investment and ex post remedy activities by the
firm. We consider a setting where, before selling its product to heterogeneous consumers,
a firm can make observable quality investment,5 and after sales, it learns about the real-
ization of quality and can take remedy if the product is of low quality or is unsafe (so that
there might be consumer harm).6 We investigate the interactions between the firm’s ex
post remedy and ex ante investment, how both activities depend on product liability, and
the privately versus socially optimal liability rules. Our analysis identifies two potential
effects of product liability on a firm’s ex ante investment incentive: (i) Substitution effect :
An increase in product liability increases the firm’s incentive for ex post remedy, which,
however, may negatively affect the firm’s incentive for ex ante quality investment. (ii) Out-
put effect : Higher product liability increases consumer demand for the product and leads
to higher equilibrium output given ex ante investment (despite a higher expected marginal
cost to the firm and a higher price), which increases the return to (incentive for) ex ante
3Business Insurance, March 17, 2008
4For example, automobile manufacturers have rushed to promote their new SUVs, though there were
many warnings about safety issues. These firms later modified the safety design after Ford and Firestone
recalled Explorers with tire problems. (Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2010)
5By assuming that ex ante investment is publicly observable, we abstract from considerations such as the
signaling role of prices and the firm’s incentives for information disclosure, which have been studied in the
literature.
6We can thus think of a low-quality product in our setting as one with some defects, which could cause
consumer harm.
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quality investment. These two opposing effects can lead to an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between ex ante quality investment and product liability, with the highest investment
sometimes obtained when there is less than full liability.
We further show that the firm always prefers full liability, whereas consumer surplus and
social welfare may be higher under partial liability. The firm’s preference for full liability
arises in our model primarily because of the endogeneity of consumer demand and the
commitment role of product liability. In the absence of reputation considerations and of a
legal requirement from the liability law, the firm lacks the ex post incentive to take remedy
(such as product recalls) should its product cause consumer harm due to low quality, which
lowers consumer demand. Full product liability enables the firm to commit to taking such ex
post remedy and internalizing the loss to consumers, which leads to higher consumer demand
and to levels of ex post remedy and ex ante investment that are optimal for the firm. If
only ex post remedy were feasible, consumers would also prefer full product liability. When
ex ante investment is also possible, however, consumers may prefer less than full product
liability, and the reason is more subtle. A lower liability may increase the firm’s ex ante
investment, due to the substitution effect, which improves product quality and possibly
to higher equilibrium output. Because the firm is unable to appropriate all the consumer
gains from higher product quality and higher output, its ex ante investment tends to be
inefficiently low under full liability.7 Thus partial liability can result in higher consumer
surplus and social welfare than full liability.8
In particular, holding all else constant, when the potential consumer loss from low quality
is large enough, the output effect dominates the substitution effect on ex ante investment,
in which case full liability motivates higher ex ante investment and more sales than partial
liability. In this case, it is socially optimal to implement full product liability. In contrast,
7Given the equilibrium output, if L = D (full liability), the firm’s ex post remedy incentive coincides
with that of the society.
8Other studies have also shown that full liability may not be socially optimal, but it is usually because
of potential inefficient behavior (or negligence) from consumers (e.g., Brown, 1973; Diamond, 1974; Shavell,
1980). Our result is obtained without consumer moral hazard. We discuss the issue of consumer negligence
in Section 5.
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when the potential loss is at an intermediate level, the substitution effect can dominate the
output effect, in which case partial liability leads to higher ex ante investment, and hence
can result in higher consumer surplus and social welfare. Similarly, holding all else constant,
full liability is socially optimal if ex post remedy cost is large enough or if the effectiveness of
remedy is small enough, whereas partial liability can benefit consumers and increase social
welfare when neither is too large or too small. These findings provide important policy
implications on product liability. Moreover, they also have related policy implications on
limited enforcement of warranty, consumer negligence, and punitive damage compensation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and discusses
related applications. Section 3 examines how the liability rule affects the firm’s ex post
remedy choice and ex ante quality investment. Section 4 characterizes the profit-maximizing
versus socially optimal liability rules. Section 5 discusses several related policies and possible
extensions, including product warranty and return policies, consumer negligence, punitive
damage compensation, and the robustness of our results. Section 6 concludes. All proofs
are in the appendix.
2. THE MODEL
There are two periods: the ex ante period when a firm sells its product to heterogeneous
consumers, and the ex post period when the firm learns additional information about prod-
uct quality (or safety) and may take remedies such as product recalls or product upgrades.
In the ex ante period, before sales, the true product quality is uncertain, with θ repre-
senting the probability that the product is of high quality and 1 − θ the probability that
the product is of low quality. The firm can make investment to increase the high-quality
probability, θ ∈ [0, θ]. The investment costs, k(θ), is increasing and strictly convex in θ,
with k′(0) = 0. We assume that there is always a non-trivial probability that the product
is of low quality. That is, θ < 1. This assumption reflects the reality that the firm cannot
perfectly control the product quality. Assume that θ is close to one.
Consumers can observe the firm’s investment level. However, before sales, neither the
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firm nor consumers can observe the true quality of the product. These assumptions capture
two features of ex ante quality investments for many products. While a firm can invest to
have safer product designs, test product quality under different scenarios, or add precaution
devices, there can still be uncertainty on product quality, which the firm may learn only
after the product is used by (some) consumers. Also, in marketing their products, firms have
incentives to disclose their quality investment through product certificates, user manuals,
or product tests. Alternatively, government agencies often require firms to disclose their
product quality before sales. These disclosures indirectly reflect firms’ quality investment.
For example, an automobile manufacturer has to disclose the outcomes of car tests and
consumers can observe the safety designs.
The total mass of consumers is normalized to 1. Consumers’ values for the product,
when it is of high quality, are distributed according to c.d.f. F (v) , with a corresponding
density function f(v) > 0 on support v ∈ [0, v]. We impose the regularity condition that
f(v) is log-concave (i.e., d2 ln f (v) /dv2 ≤ 0).9 This condition implies that the hazard
rate, λ (v) ≡ f(v)1−F (v) , is non-decreasing (i.e., λ
′ (v) ≥ 0). Define the inverse hazard rate as
H (v) ≡ 1
λ(v) . If the product is of low quality, it may reduce consumers’ value or cause harm
to consumers (independently) with probability γ, which is also uncertain ex ante and follows
a distribution G(γ), with a corresponding density function g(γ) > 0 on [0, 1].10 When a
consumer is harmed, her value is reduced by D.
After making the quality investment, the firm sets its price, and each consumer decides
whether to purchase the product based on her realized v, her expectations about θ, γ and
potential remedies by the firm if the product is of low quality. The firm’s total sales is
defined as Q.
In the ex post period, after sales, the firm privately learns the true quality of the product.
If the product is of low quality, the firm also privately learns the realization of γ (how serious
9This assumption is satisfied by familiar distributions including uniform, exponential, normal, truncated
t-distribution, and extreme-value distribution.
10As we mentioned earlier in the Introduction, we can think of a low-quality product as containing some
defect. A more serious defect has a higher probability (γ) to cause consumer harm.
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the defect is). The firm may then choose to take ex post remedy to improve the product
quality. However, the ex post remedy is not fully effective and can only fix a proportion
β < 1 of the sold product, with remedy costs CβQ. For example, in most product recalls,
not all consumers are informed about the recall or will return the product (possibly due to
inconvenience or return costs).11 We assume that β is exogenously given here.12
If a consumer is harmed, the firm will give compensation L to the consumer according
to product liability. The firm bears "partial liability" if L < D, "full liability" if L = D,
and punitive damage compensation if L > D. Note that our framework can be applied in
two different scenarios. Under the scenario of product safety, a product of low quality may
harm consumers. After learning the potential harm, the firm can make product recalls to
fix or replace the defected product. If a consumer is harmed, the firm bears liability L.
Under an alternative scenario, a product of low quality may not deliver the expected value
to consumers. For example, after selling a medical equipment or drug, a pharmaceutical
firm may learn that this equipment or drug could not deliver the surgery effects claimed
during sales. Then the firm can upgrade the equipment or replace with another new drug
for the consumers. Similarly, after sales, a manufacturer of an industrial machine may find
that the machine would depreciate more quickly than the claimed usage life. Then the firm
can take remedy to extend the usage life. In both types of applications, L could be the
liability determined by courts or given by the firm’s warranty. In the basic model, we will
focus on policies determined by courts or governments.13 In Section 5, we will discuss what
11 In practice, most recalls have low return rates. For example, the return rates of many product recalls
were between 10% and 30% (New York Times, April 12, 2002). Even for automobiles, the return rates were
estimated to be between 20% and 70% (The Philadelphia Inquirer, September 10, 2000).
12 In Sections 4 and 5, we will also separately examine two policies that affect β: (1) Government may
require the firm to keep better records of consumers’ information during sales and monitor the firm’s in-
formation disclosure when taking ex post remedies. Such policies can increase β. (2) Courts may adopt
contributory negligence rule or set a lower standard in determining consumer negligence: the firm’s liability
may be reduced or denied if consumers do not comply with the firm’s remedy.
13 In practice, a firm’s ex ante quality investment and ex post remedy may also involve reputation and
other dynamic considerations. However, product liability still has important effects given the limitation of
those market mechanisms. In this paper, we abstract away from these additional considerations, to focus on
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happens if the firm can choose the warranty level itself.
3. EX ANTE INVESTMENT AND EX POST REMEDY
In this section, we first derive the expected costs of low quality to the firm and to the
consumers, which determine the expected social cost. We then derive consumer demand
and the firm’s optimal output. One key observation is that the firm’s optimal output can
be expressed as a function of investment θ and the expected social cost per unit of output
(∆), which allows us to conveniently characterize two benchmarks where either ex ante
investment is not considered (so that θ is given) or ex post remedy is not available. We
then analyze our general case where the firm can take both ex ante investment and ex
post remedy, and examine how the firm’s optimal quality investment depends on the firm’s
liability L, the unit remedy cost C, the effectiveness of remedy β, and potential damage
D.14
In the ex-post period, suppose that the firm finds product quality to be low. Then the firm
will take remedy if and only if CβQ < γβLQ, or equivalently,15 γ > C
L
.That is, there will
be ex post remedy only when it is sufficiently likely for consumers to be harmed. Therefore,
from the ex ante point of view, given low product quality, the firm’s expected ex post cost
per unit of output is
x =
∫ C
L
0
γLdG(γ) +
∫ 1
C
L
[βC + (1− β)γL]dG(γ), (1)
whereas the expected ex post loss for any consumer using a low-quality product is
the role of product liability.
14Strictly speaking, we solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. When it will not
cause confusion, we simply describe the equilibrium actions of the firm and the consumers as optimal actions.
15With probability 1 − β, a consumer will not “participate” in the firm’s ex post remedy. Under strict
liability, the firm will then have the same expected ex post cost from such a consumer, γ (1− β)LQ, whether
or not it takes remedy actions. In Section 5, we discuss how our analysis would be affected if a consumer
needs to bear responsibility for negligence.
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y =
∫ C
L
0
γ(D − L)dG(γ) +
∫ 1
C
L
(1− β)γ(D − L)dG(γ). (2)
Thus, given low product quality, the expected ex post social cost per unit of output is
given by
∆ ≡ x+ y =
∫ C
L
0
γDdG(γ) +
∫ 1
C
L
[βC + (1− β)γD]dG(γ). (3)
Notice that
d∆
dL
= D
C
L
g
(
C
L
)(
−
C
L2
)
+ [βC + (1− β)
C
L
D]g
(
C
L
)
C
L2
= g
(
C
L
)
C
L2
βC
[
1−
D
L
]
. (4)
Simple calculations lead to the following:
Lemma 1 (i) Ex post, d∆/dL  0 if L  D, and it is socially efficient to have L = D.
(ii) d∆/dD > 0, d∆/dC > 0, and d∆/dβ < 0. .
Intuitively, if the firm bears full liability L = D, it will make the socially efficient decision
on ex post remedy. If L < D, then there will be too few remedies relative to the socially
desired; if L > D, there will be too many remedies.16 Note that L > D includes punitive
damage compensation. Although in theory punitive compensation can be implemented, in
practice punitive compensation often cannot be too large perhaps because firms can seek for
bankruptcy protection. For convenience, we restrict our analysis to the case with L ≤ D.17
Given the anticipated ex post cost, a consumer will buy the product ex ante if and only
if her value is large enough:
16 In our model, there is no ex-post heterogeneity among consumers. This simplifies the ex-post efficiency
analysis, allowing us to focus on the interaction between ex-ante investment and ex-post remedy. If consumers
face heterogeneous harm or return costs, then the firm may not have the right incentives to make socially
efficient remedy even when L = D (Hua, 2009; and Spier, 2009).
17 In Section 5, we will discuss the possibility of allowing L > D. For any given L′ > D, as long as L′
is not too large, there exists a certain level L < D which leads to the same ex post social cost, that is,
∆(L) = ∆(L′). As it will become clear shortly, the firm’s ex ante quality investment only depends on the
expected social cost ∆, and consequently it is without loss of generality to assume L ≤ D as long as L
cannot be much higher than D.
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v − p− (1− θ)y ≥ 0.
Correspondingly, the total demand for the firm’s product is
Q = 1− F (p+ (1− θ)y),
or, the inverse demand is
p = F−1(1−Q)− (1− θ)y. (5)
Given the ex ante quality investment θ, the firm chooses Q to maximize its profit
Π(θ) ≡ max
Q≤1
Q [p− (1− θ)x] = max
Q≤1
Q[F−1(1−Q)− (1− θ)(x+ y)]
= max
Q≤1
Q[F−1(1−Q)− (1− θ)∆]. (6)
Under the monotone hazard rate, it is easy to verify that the above objective function is
concave. The first order condition is
F−1(1−Q)−
Q
f [F−1(1−Q)]
= (1− θ)∆. (7)
Define
t = F−1(1−Q), (8)
then t monotonically decreases in Q, and equation (7) becomes
t−
1− F (t)
f(t)
= (1− θ)∆. (9)
Define the firm’s profit-maximizing output as Q(θ,∆). Given θ, t in equation (9) increases
in ∆. That is, Q(θ,∆) decreases in ∆, the unit social cost from low product quality. Note
that, for a consumer with v = t, she is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing
the product. In fact, since the expected social cost from low quality under output Q(θ,∆)
is (1 − θ)Q∆, the same as the reduction to the firm’s maximum profit, given ex ante
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investment θ, the firm fully internalizes the social cost from low quality when setting its
price. Intuitively, a lower liability L reduces each consumer’s expected utility from the
product, which reduces consumer demand; but it also decreases the firm’s expected marginal
(ex post) cost from selling the product. These two effects happen to exactly offset each other.
Hence, given θ, the firm bears the full social cost from low quality. Furthermore, by the
envelope theorem
dΠ(θ)
dL
= −Q (1− θ)
d∆
dL
= 0
when L = D. That is, if there were no ex ante investment on quality (so that θ is given),
the firm’s profit would be maximized if there is full liability (L = D). We thus have:
Lemma 2 Given ex ante quality investment θ, the expected cost from low quality is the
same for the firm as for the society, and the profit-maximizing liability is L = D, same as
the ex post socially efficient liability.
The firm’s ex ante quality investment is determined by the following problem:
max
θ
Q(θ,∆)[F−1(1−Q(θ.∆))− (1− θ)∆]− k(θ).
From the envelop theorem, the optimal ex ante quality investment satisfies
Q(θ,∆)∆− k′(θ) = 0. (10)
Define the firm’s optimal ex ante investment as θ(∆). Note that, if the firm has no
opportunity to take ex post remedy, the unit ex post social cost∆ from low quality would be
fixed. The firm’s liability would then be merely a transfer between the firm and consumers.
If the firm bears larger liability, the firm’s ex post cost would be increased by a certain
amount; at the same time, consumers’ willingness to pay would be increased by the same
amount. The effects of these two changes on the firm’s profit exactly cancel each other, as
pi (θ) in (6) is unchanged when ∆ is unchanged. We thus have:
Lemma 3 If the firm could not take ex post remedy, its optimal ex ante quality investment,
the equilibrium output, and social welfare would be independent of ex post liability L.
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Now consider our general case where θ is determined endogenously when both ex ante
investment and ex post remedy are possible. From condition (10), we see that a reduction
in ∆ can either increase or decrease θ, depending on how Q(θ,∆)∆ varies with θ. Therefore,
the firm’s optimal ex ante quality investment may not be monotone in the expected social
cost. In fact, the equilibrium θ is an inverted U-shaped function of ∆, as shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique cut-off ∆̂ > 0, such that the firm’s optimal ex ante
quality investment θ(∆) increases in ∆ when ∆ < ∆̂ and decreases in ∆ when ∆ > ∆̂.
Note that, from condition (10), the unit social cost ∆ from low quality affects θ both
directly as a cost for each unit of output and indirectly through its effect on the output.
As ∆ increases, the direct cost effect tends to raise θ, whereas the indirect effect through a
reduction in output tends to lower θ. When ∆ is small, the direct effect dominates; but as
∆ increases, the indirect effect eventually must dominate since θ will become zero when ∆
is high enough. Therefore there will be some ∆̂ at which dθ/d∆ = 0, and the monotonicity
of H (·) ensures that ∆ˆ is unique. Thus the equilibrium θ is an inverted U-shaped function
of ∆.18
Since from Lemma 1 d∆/dL < 0 for L < D, the firm’s ex ante quality investment may
also be non-monotonic in the firm’s liability:
Corollary 1 Consider the range L ≤ D. There exists a unique cut-off L̂ ∈ [0,D], such
that the firm’s optimal ex-ante quality investment θ(∆) increases in L when L < L̂; and,
if L̂ < D, θ(∆) decreases in L when L > L̂ . Furthermore, (1 − θ)∆ decreases in L and
Q (θ,∆) increases in L when L < L̂.
A change in product liability can potentially have two opposing effects on ex ante quality
investment. On one hand, given output Q, there is a "substitution effect": more ex post
remedy due to a larger L reduces ∆, which in turn leads to lower ex ante investment (so θ
18However, it is possible that the relevant ∆ in a given problem is below ∆ˆ, in which case θ monotonically
increases in ∆.
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is lower). On the other hand, there is an "output effect": lower ∆ leads to a larger quantity
of sales Q, which in turn increases the firm’s ex ante investment (so θ is higher). Suppose
that there is some interior Lˆ ∈ (0, D) such that ∆̂ = ∆(L̂). Then, when product liability
(L) is small enough, the firm has low incentive to take ex post remedy and thus the unit
ex post social cost from low quality is high. In this case, an increase in L lowers ∆, which
in turn raises θ (since dθ/d∆ < 0 when ∆ > ∆ˆ, or L < Lˆ). That is, the output effect from
the increase in product liability dominates the substitution effect, so that the firm’s ex ante
quality investment is higher. In contrast, when the firm’s liability is large (L > Lˆ), the
firm has high incentives to take ex post remedy, which reduces the unit ex post social costs
(∆ < ∆ˆ). In this case, the substitution effect dominates, so that an increase in L lowers ∆
and also θ.19 Notice that Lˆ can be at the corner, in which case θ monotonically increases
in L if Lˆ = D and θ monotonically decreases in L when Lˆ = 0. We shall later give examples
where Lˆ can be interior or at one of the corners.
Since the unit ex post remedy cost (C), the remedy effectiveness parameter (β), and the
potential damage level (D) all affect the unit ex post social cost of low quality (∆), the
firm’s ex ante quality investment may also not be monotone in these variables, similarly
as with product liability. The result below follows straightforwardly from Lemma 1 and
Proposition 1.
Corollary 2 Given L, there exist unique cut-offs C(L), β(L), D(L), such that the firm’s
optimal ex ante quality investment θ(∆) increases in C, β, and D respectively when C <
C(L), β < β(L), or D < D(L), whereas θ(∆) decreases in C, β, and D respectively when
C ≥ C(L), β ≥ β(L), or D ≥ D(L).
As potential damage D increase, the firm has more incentive to take ex ante quality
investment as long as D is below the cut-off. However, when D becomes too large (above
the cut-off), the firm would rather reduce its output to lower its expected ex post cost from
low product quality, and the lower output reduces the incentive for ex ante investment.
Similarly, increasing β, the effectiveness of ex post remedy, may not always increase the ex
19Note that if L̂ < D, an increase in L has ambiguous effects on (1− θ)∆ and Q(θ,∆) when L > L̂.
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ante quality investment or decrease the expected ex post social cost. Therefore, policies
that increase β, such as requiring firms to keep better record of consumers’ information
or monitoring firms’ disclosure of ex post remedy information, may not always increase
(expected) product quality.
We now illustrate our findings in this section with the following examples. For both
examples, suppose that γ is distributed uniformly on [0, 1],
Example 1 Suppose that consumers’ value follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. In
addition, k(θ) = θ2/2 if θ ≤ 0.9 and k(θ) = M if θ > 0.9, where M is sufficiently large
(for example, M ≥ D) so that θ = 0.9. Let C = 0.5 and β = 1. We have:
(1)If D ≤ 1.172, then θ decreases in L for any L ≤ D.
(2)If D > 1.172: then there exists L̂ < D such that θ strictly increases in L for L < L̂ and
strictly decreases in L for L > L̂. For instance, when D = 2, L̂ = 0.787.
In Example 1, the equilibrium θ is an inverted U-shaped function of L ≤ D when D is
high enough. Example 2 below illustrates that the equilibrium θ may only weakly increase
or decrease in L.
Example 2 Suppose that consumers’ value follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. In
addition, k(θ) = θ2/8 if θ ≤ 0.9 and k(θ) = M if θ > 0.9, where M is sufficiently large
(for example, M ≥ D) so that θ = 0.9. Let C = 0.5 and β = 1.
(1)If D ≤ 0.944, then θ decreases in L for any L ≤ D (i.e. the substitution effect domi-
nates).
(2)If 0.944 < D ≤ 4.464: then there exists L̂ < D such that θ increases in L for L < L̂ and
decreases in L for L > L̂.
(3)If D ≥ 4.464: then θ weakly increases in L for any L ≤ D (i.e., the output effect
dominates).20
In sum, this section has shown that there may be a non-monotone relationship between
the firm’s ex ante quality investment and ex post remedy incentives. Increasing the firm’s
20 If D is too large, for any L ≤ D, the firm would not product at all and, correspondingly, θ = 0.
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liability may not always increase the ex ante quality investment or reduce the expected
ex post social cost. This observation will have important implications for determining the
socially optimal liability policy, which we next turn to.
4. PRIVATE V.S. SOCIAL INCENTIVES FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY
In this section, we examine how product liability L affects firm profit, consumer surplus,
and social welfare. These discussions will shed light on whether it is socially optimal to
impose full liability or partial liability for the firm. As discussed in Section 3, for ease of
exposition we assume L ≤ D.
Define social welfare as W = Π+ U , where Π is the firm’s expected profit and U is the
aggregate consumer surplus. From the analysis in Section 3, we have
Π = max
θ
Q(θ,∆)[F−1(1−Q(θ,∆))− (1− θ)∆]− k(θ),
U =
∫ v¯
t
(v − t)dF (v) =
∫ v¯
F−1(1−Q(θ,∆))
[
v − F−1(1−Q(θ,∆))
]
dF (v).
Note that consumer surplus only depends on total output Q(θ,∆). Intuitively, the mar-
ginal consumer with v = t is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing the product.
From the ex ante point of view, all consumers face the same expected harm if the product
quality is low. When there are more sales, there is more information rent for consumers.
Proposition 2 Firm profit is maximized under full liability L = D.
Thus, ex ante, the firm always prefers full liability, although ex post the firm would
prefer no liability. Intuitively, if the firm bears only partial liability, it may not take ex post
remedy as socially desired. The unit ex post social cost from low quality would be larger.
As discussed in Section 3, the firm fully internalizes the social cost from low quality. Full
liability allows the firm to create the intertemporal commitment to take efficient ex post
remedy that minimizes expected unit social cost from low quality.
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However, given that the firm has market power, to minimize unit ex post social cost of low
quality, the firm may reduce its output and therefore consumer surplus would be decreased.
Note that the firm’s output depends on its ex ante quality investment. Some of our results
below will use the following condition.
Condition T1: k′′′(θ) ≤ 0 and sup∆ θ (∆) > 1/2.
Condition T1 is satisfied as long as the firm’s ex-ante investment costs are not too large,
and the product is more likely to have high quality than to have low quality in equilibrium.
For example, it is satisfied if consumers’ value follows the uniform distribution and k(θ) =
aθ2, for any a ≤ 18 .
The following lemma shows that the firm’s optimal quantity of sales may not be monotone
in the unit social cost of low quality.
Lemma 4 Q(θ,∆) and U decrease in ∆ when ∆ ≥ ∆̂; but they can increase in ∆ when
∆ < ∆̂. In particular, if condition T1 holds, then there exists a cut-off ∆˜ < ∆̂ such that
Q(θ,∆) and U increase in ∆ if ∆˜ ≤ ∆ < ∆̂.
Intuitively, when ∆ is large enough, as discussed in Section 3, the output effect dominates
the substitution effect: when ∆ increases further, the firm takes less ex ante quality invest-
ment. Correspondingly, the expected unit social cost (1− θ)∆ becomes larger and reduces
output even further. On the other hand, when ∆ is small enough, the substitution effect
dominates the output effect: as ∆ increases, the firm takes more ex ante quality investment.
If such ex ante investment increases more quickly than the increase in ∆, then the expected
unit social cost (1− θ)∆ becomes smaller and output increases.
Proposition 3 Suppose that condition T1 holds. (1) Given C and β, there exist two cut-
offs D˜ < D̂: If D ≥ D̂, consumer surplus is maximized under full liability; if D˜ ≤ D < D̂,
consumer surplus is maximized under partial liability. (2) Given D and β, there exist
two cut-offs C˜ < Ĉ : If C ≥ Ĉ, consumer surplus is maximized under full liability; if
C˜ ≤ C < Ĉ, consumer surplus is maximized under partial liability. (3) Given D and C,
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there exist two cut-offs β˜ > β̂ : If β ≤ β̂, consumer surplus is maximized under full liability;
if β̂ < β ≤ β˜, consumer surplus is maximized under partial liability.
The above results provide clear policy implications. In order to increase consumer surplus,
it may not be optimal to impose full liability for the firm. Under full liability, the firm would
take ex post remedy to minimize the unit ex-post social cost from low quality. Anticipating
this, as long as the potential damage level and remedy cost are not too large, and ex post
remedy is effective enough, the firm might reduce output ex ante, which in turn would
reduce consumer surplus.
The previous analysis suggests that the firm and consumers may have conflicting incen-
tives for full product liability. Therefore, full liability may not maximize social welfare.
Suppose that H ′(v) is bounded for any v ∈ [0, v]. Define h = maxv[−H
′(v)].
Condition T2: k′′′(θ) ≤ 0 and sup∆ θ (∆) >
2+h
3+h .
For many familiar log-concave distributions, H ′(v) is bounded for any v ∈ [0, v]. The
above condition is satisfied as long as the firm’s ex ante investment costs are not too large
or the probability of high quality is not always lower than 2+h3+h in equilibrium. For example,
T2 is satisfied if consumers’ value follows the uniform distribution and k(θ) = aθ2, for any
a ≤ 18
The following proposition shows that partial liability (L < D) can be socially optimal.
Proposition 4 Suppose that condition T2 holds. (1) Given C and β, there exist a cut-off
D′ ∈ [D˜, D̂): If D ≥ D̂, social welfare is maximized under full liability; if D′ ≤ D < D̂,
social welfare is maximized under partial liability. (2) Given D and β, there exists a cut-off
C′ ∈ [C˜, Ĉ) : If C ≥ Ĉ, social welfare is maximized under full liability; if C′ ≤ C < Ĉ,
social welfare is maximized under partial liability. (3) Given D and C, there exists a cut-off
β′ ∈ (β̂, β˜]: If β ≤ β̂, social welfare is maximized under full liability; if β̂ < β ≤ β′, social
welfare is maximized under partial liability.
We illustrate the findings with examples which are continuations of Example 2 in Section
3:
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Example 3 Suppose that consumers’ value follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. In
addition, k(θ) = θ2/8 if θ ≤ 0.9 and k(θ) =M if θ > 0.9, where M is sufficiently large (for
example, M ≥ D). That is, θ = 0.9. Assume that γ also follows the uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. Then we have the following relationship between social welfare and the unit ex
post social costs from low quality:
W


decreases in ∆ if ∆ ∈ [0, 0.399]
increases in ∆ if ∆ ∈ (0.399, 0.472]
decreases in ∆ if ∆ ∈ (0.472,∞)
.
The above relationship provides the base for the following results on how damage level
D, remedy costs C, or effectiveness of remedy β affects the socially optimal liability. Recall
that
∆ ≡
∫ C
L
0
γDdG(γ) +
∫ 1
C
L
[βC + (1− β)γD]dG(γ).
First, given β, Figure 1 illustrates how the socially optimal liability depends on the
damage level D and the remedy costs C, where the red curve is defined by C = D −
D
√
1− 0.944
D
, the green curve is define by C = D −D
√
1− 0.614
D
, and the purple curve is
from simulation such that no liability and full liability lead to the same social welfare for
D < 0.944. Notice that full liability L = D is more efficient in Range F where either D or
C is sufficiently high; partial liability L ∈ (0, D) is more efficient in Range P where both D
and C are intermediate; and it is more efficient to impose no liability for the firm in Range
N. Also, in this particular example, full liability is more efficient in Range F* where C is
sufficiently small. These results are consistent with the general predictions in Proposition
4.
In particular, let C = 0.5 and β = 1. Then full liability is more efficient when D ≤ 0.870 or
D ≥ 4.464; partial liability L ∈ (0,D) is more efficient when the damage level is intermediate
(0.944 ≤ D ≤ 4.464); zero liability is more efficient when 0.870 ≤ D ≤ 0.944.
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Figure 1: Optimal Liability (Given β = 1)
Second, given D, Figure 2 illustrates how the socially optimal liability depends on the
effectiveness (β) and the unit cost (C) of ex-post remedy, where the red curve is defined by
β = 0.056
(C−1)2
; the green curve is defined by β = 0.385
(C−1)2
. As shown in Figure 2, partial liability
is more efficient when β or C is intermediate; otherwise full liability is more efficient.
In particular, let D = 1 and C = 0.2. Then full liability is more efficient when β > 0.602
or β < 0.088; otherwise partial liability is more efficient. Furthermore, let D = 1 and
β = 0.5. Then full liability is more efficient when C > 0.665 or C < 0.122; otherwise partial
liability is more efficient.
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Figure 2: Optimal Liability (Given D = 1)
Intuitively, when the potential damage is large enough, the ex-post remedy is too costly
or not very effective, the unit ex post social cost from low quality is large enough. In this
scenario, the output effect dominates the substitution effect of larger liability. Therefore,
when the firm bears larger liability, both output Q and the ex ante investment θ would
increase, which increases overall social welfare. That is, full liability is socially optimal. In
contrast, when the potential damage, the remedy cost or the effectiveness of remedy is at
intermediate level, the substitution effect dominates the output effect. Moreover, when the
firm bears larger liability, the output and the ex-ante investment may decrease, which may
reduce social welfare. Therefore, partial liability can be more efficient than full liability.
Proposition 4 and the above illustrations provide several interesting policy implications.
A policy or liability rule should consider its effects on output and address the potential
non-monotone relationship between ex ante investments and ex post remedies. Although a
larger product liability can motivate the firm to take more ex post remedies, it may reduce
ex ante investments and output. As shown in the above numeric examples, for a range
of parameter values, partial liability is more efficient than full liability. In practice, the
liability rule should depend on the potential damage level and ex post remedy costs. For
products with large consumer damage (perhaps such as cars) relative to ex post remedy
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costs, full liability is more efficient than partial liability; for products with intermediate
damage compared to ex post remedy costs, partial liability could be more efficient.
Government agencies such as the US Food and Drug Administration have required firms to
keep better record of consumer information or monitor firms’ disclosure of ex post remedies,
in order to increase the effectiveness of remedies. While we find such policies can often
increase consumer surplus and social welfare by increasing β or potentially reducing C, it
is intriguing that a higher β or a lower C sometimes can reduce firms’ ex ante investment
and output, which may reduce social welfare.
5. DISCUSSIONS
5.1 Product Warranty
The previous analysis assumes that the firm cannot commit to making ex post remedy if
it bears no liability. One way for the firm to create such inter-temporal commitment is to
offer warranties. The existing literature on warranty mainly views warranty as a signaling
device for a firm’s unobservable quality choice or quality investment (e.g. Grossman, 1981;
Cooper and Ross, 1985; Lutz, 1989).21 It typically considers a firm’s expected compensation
to consumers when a quality problem arises, but does not address the possibility for the
firm to take ex post remedies before consumers are harmed.
Suppose that the firm could issue a warranty which specifies compensation L to a con-
sumer when she has utility loss due to low quality. The firm can take ex post remedy after
sales. As shown in Section 4, the firm prefers full warranty L = D, which provides commit-
ment that the firm would take efficient ex post remedy. Such a full warranty, if perfectly
enforced, maximizes the firm’s profits.
In practice, firms often offer limited warranty, because a full warranty may unduly reduce
consumer care in using the product. Our findings in Section 4 suggest that a limited
warranty can sometimes be what consumers prefer, because it can lead to higher ex ante
21Similarly, during sales, firms may offer return policies as signaling devices (Moorthy and Srinivasan,
1995). Return policies may also enhance risk sharing between a firm and its consumers (Che, 1996).
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quality investment and output, which benefits consumers.
Another potential welfare loss from full warranty is that consumers may not comply
with the firm’s ex post remedies. On one hand, with full warranty, consumers’ negligence
would reduce the effectiveness of the firm’s ex post remedies; on the other hand, it may
induce the firm to make more ex ante investment. The next subsection provides more
general discussions on whether consumers’ negligence should be considered in determining
the firm’s liability.
5.2 Effectiveness of ex post Remedy and Consumer Negligence
Our main model assumes that β is exogenously given. In practice, the effects of ex post
remedies may hinge on consumers’ awareness or incentives to comply with the firm’s ex post
remedies. Consumers’ incentives can be affected by liability rules. For example, courts may
use either strict liability or negligence rules.22 Under strict liability, the firm bears the same
liability L no matter whether it has taken ex post remedies or not. Under negligence rules,
the firm’s liability may be reduced if the firm has taken ex post remedies and consumers
get informed but do not comply.23 Under negligence rules, consumers have more incentives
to comply with the firm’s remedies such as recalls.
Assume that, under strict liability as analyzed in Section 3, the ex post remedy can fix
a proportion β of the sold product; under the negligence rule, the ex post remedy can fix a
proportion βN > β of the sold product.
Under the negligence rule, the firm no longer bears liability if consumers do not comply
with ex post remedies. Hence, the firm will take ex post remedies if and only if CβNQ <
γLQ. Given low product quality, the expected ex post social costs per unit of the product
are defined as
22There is a large literature comparing strict liability and negligence rules. For examples, see Brown
(1973), Green (1976), Shavell (1980), Rubinfeld (1987), Emons (1990), Emons and Sobel (1991) , Bar-Gill
and Ben-Shahar (2003),
23The choice between strict liability and negligence rules may affect the firm’s incentives to take ex-post
remedies, for example, as discussed in Hua (2009).
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∆N =
∫ CβN
L
γDdG(γ) +
∫
CβN
L
[βNC + (1− βN)γD]dG(γ).
In contrast, as shown in Section 3, under strict liability, the firm will take ex post remedies
if and only if CβQ < γβLQ. Given low product quality, the expected ex post social costs
per unit of the product are defined as
∆S =
∫ C
L
γDdG(γ) +
∫
C
L
[βC + (1− β)γD]dG(γ).
When the legal system is changed from strict liability to negligence rules, the firm is more
likely to take ex post remedies, since CβN
L
< C
L
. However, this change may not necessarily
increase ex post efficiency. To see this, suppose that βND < L. Then
CβN
L
< C
D
, that is,
the negligence rule leads the firm to take too many ex post remedies relative to socially
desired; but the ex post remedies become more effective. In this case, negligence rules may
lead to either higher or lower ex post social costs than strict liability.
If βND ≥ L, then
C
D
≤ CβN
L
< C
L
. That is, the negligence rule leads the firm to take more
efficient ex post remedies and furthermore, the ex post remedies become more effective. In
this case, ex post social costs are reduced, i.e.,∆N < ∆S . However, according to Proposition
4, if condition T2 holds, for any ∆ ∈ (∆′, ∆̂), reducing ex post social costs would decrease
social welfare. Therefore, if ∆′ < ∆N < ∆S < ∆̂, strict liability is socially more efficient.
The full-fledged comparison between strict liability and negligence rules is ambiguous in this
general framework. However, this section illustrates that the choice between strict liability
and negligence rules should also take firms’ ex ante quality investment and ex ante output
into consideration. If negligence rules increase ex post efficiency but reduce firms’ ex ante
quality investment and ex ante output significantly, then it may be more efficient to impose
strict liability or set a higher standard for evidence in determining consumers’ negligence.
5.3 Punitive Damage Compensation
Our main analysis in Sections 3 and 4 focuses on the scenario with L ≤ D. In practice,
sometimes courts may impose punitive damage compensation so that L > D. If there is
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punitive compensation, as shown in Lemma 1, the firm would take ex post remedy more
frequently than socially desired. In addition, the following proposition shows that, as long
as punitive damage compensation cannot be too large (perhaps because firms can resort
to bankruptcy protection), partial liability L < D can lead to the same social welfare as
punitive damage compensation.
Proposition 5 Suppose that condition T2 holds. (1) If
∫ 1
0 (C − γD)dG(γ) ≤ 0, then for
any punitive damage compensation L > D, there exists L′ < D which leads to the same
social efficiency. (2) If
∫ 1
0 (C − γD)dG(γ) > 0, then there exists L > D such that punitive
damage compensation L > L can be more efficient than L ≤ D.
Intuitively, the firm’s liability only affects the level of unit ex post social cost ∆, but does
not directly affect the firm’s optimal output and the ex ante quality investment. Therefore,
the firm’s liability only influences social welfare through the change of ∆. For punitive
damage compensation L ∈ (D,L], we can always find a partial liability level which leads
to the same ex post social cost and correspondingly, the same social welfare. Furthermore,
if punitive damage compensation is very large (L > L), it causes the firm to take more
ex post remedy than socially desired. However, given intermediate damage levels, it may
increase the firm’s ex ante quality investment and the output level. Therefore, very larger
punitive damage compensation may increase social welfare in this case. In practice, it is
often difficult to impose very large punitive damage compensation, especially when firms
can seek bankruptcy protection or the legal enforcement is not perfect.
5.4 Alternative Quality Investment Technology
In the main model, the firm’s ex ante quality investment θ affects the probability for the
product to have low quality. Given the product of low quality, the likelihood for consumers
to be harmed, γ, is uncertain but not contingent on θ. For example, before sales, the firm
may take R&D investment to have safer product design. However, there is still non-trivial
probability for the product to have design defect. Given the design defect, the likelihood for
consumers to be harmed depends on the nature of the defect as well as consumers’ usage.
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The results on the relationship between ex ante quality investment and ex post remedies
can still hold in an alternative scenario where the firm’s ex ante investment θ affects the
distribution of γ.
In particular, suppose that the firm can take ex ante investment θ and the likelihood for
consumers to be harmed, γ, follows a distribution G(γ | θ). After sales, the firm privately
learns the realization of γ and then decides whether to take ex post remedy. Assume
G′θ(γ | θ) ≥ 0. That is, G(γ | θ) first-order stochastic dominates G(γ | θ
′) for any θ < θ′.
Without loss of generalization, we focus on the scenario with L ≤ D. It is easy to verify
that the firm’s optimal ex ante quality investment satisfies
Q(∆(θ, L))∆(θ, L)− k′(θ) = 0. (11)
Similar to the analysis in Section 3, when the firm’s liability L increases, there are again
two conflicting effects on the ex ante quality investment. On one hand, given the output
Q, there is a substitution effect between ex ante quality investment and ex post remedy.
On the other hand, there is an output effect: lower ∆(θ, L) may lead to a larger output Q,
which in turn increases the firm’s quality investment θ. Therefore, the firm’s optimal ex
ante investment may not be monotone in its liability.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied how product liability affects product quality/safety as well as
consumer and social welfare. We find that the interactions between a firm’s ex post remedy
for low product quality and its incentive for ex ante quality investment have important
implications for the effects of product liability. Higher liability increases ex post remedy
activities, and this can in turn reduce the incentive for ex ante investment. On the other
hand, higher liability increases consumer demand for the product, which in turn increases
the firm’s incentive for ex ante quality investment. The presence of these two opposing
effects, the substitution effect and the output effect, implies that the ex ante quality in-
vestment may not monotonically increase in product liability–the relationship may be an
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inverted U-shaped curve. While full liability maximizes profit since it allows the firm to
make the intertemporal commitment for ex post remedy, it may not be optimal for con-
sumers when it reduces ex ante quality investment and output by the firm. Full product
liability tends to be socially optimal when the potential consumer loss from low quality is
sufficiently high; otherwise partial liability can be socially optimal.
There are several directions for further research. First, given the trade-offs between the
substitution effect and the output effect, firms’ ex ante investment and ex post remedy effort
could be either substitutes or complements. It would be useful to empirically verify which
effect would dominate under different liability rules. Second, competition among different
firms may affect their ex ante investment and ex post remedies such as recalls. It would be
desirable to study the potential trade-offs involved and the implications for product liability
rules. Third, firms may continue their sales after product recalls. It would be interesting
to explore how reputation concern interacts with liability rules and how they jointly affect
firms’ ex ante investments and ex post remedies. Finally, our current paper assumes that
consumers can observe the firm’s ex ante investment. If that is not the case, the firm’s
pricing may signal its quality investment as shown in the literature. Product liability may
then have additional implications for the interaction between ex ante investment and ex
post remedies.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Given θ, the firm’s optimal output Q(θ,∆) satisfies (9), from
which we obtain
Q′(θ,∆) =
∂Q
∂t
∂t
∂∆
= −f(t)
1− θ
1−H ′(t)
.
The optimal θ satisfies either θ = θ or condition (10).
First, when ∆ = 0, condition (10) implies that θ(∆) = 0. (If there is no ex post social
cost, the firm would not make any ex ante investment.) When ∆ goes to infinity, condition
(9) and (8) imply Q(θ,∆) = 0, which also implies θ(∆) = 0. Therefore dθ/d∆ > 0 when ∆
is sufficiently small but θ eventually decreases in ∆ when ∆ is sufficiently large. It suffices
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to consider two cases as follows.
(1) Consider the case with interior solution: There exists some ∆̂ at which dθ/d∆ = 0:
From (10), we have
dθ
d∆
= −
Q(θ,∆) +∆Q′(θ,∆)
∆Q′θ(θ,∆)− k
′′(θ)
.
Note that the second order condition
∆Q′θ(θ,∆)− k
′′(θ) ≤ 0
for interior solutions θ(∆) ∈ (0, θ). Thus, the sign of dθ
d∆ is determined by that of
Q(θ,∆) +∆Q′(θ,∆).
In particular, Q(θ,∆) = 1− F (t) by definition. Thus,
Q(θ,∆) +∆Q′(θ,∆) = 1− F (t)−∆f(t)
1− θ
1−H ′(t)
.
Equivalently,
Q(θ,∆) +∆Q′(θ,∆)
f(t)
=
1− F (t)
f(t)
−∆
1− θ
1−H ′(t)
= H(t)−
(1− θ)∆
1−H ′(t)
.
Therefore, the sign of dθ
d∆ is the same as that of H(t)−
(1−θ)∆
1−H′(t) . Since by assumption f(v)
is log-concave, H ′(t) ≤ 0 and H ′′(t) ≥ 0.
Suppose that, given a particular ∆, dθ
d∆ ≤ 0, or equivalently, H(t) −
(1−θ)∆
1−H′(t) ≤ 0. When
∆ increases marginally, θ(∆) cannot increase. This implies that (1 − θ)∆ would increase.
According to condition (9), if (1− θ)∆ increases, t must increase as well. Correspondingly,
H(t) and 1 − H ′(t) would decrease. Hence H(t) − (1−θ)∆1−H ′(t) would decrease and become
even more negative. Therefore, if we start at some ∆ such that dθ
d∆ ≤ 0, for any larger ∆,
dθ
d∆ < 0.This implies that there must be a unique cut-off ∆̂ such that
dθ
d∆  0 when ∆  ∆̂.
(2) Now consider the case with corner solution or discontinuity in θ(∆): that is, there
exists some ∆̂ at which θ = θ but dθ/d∆ > 0. Since θ = θ, increasing ∆ marginally from ∆̂
cannot increase the firm’s ex-ante investment θ further. Therefore, according to condition
(9), t must increase, or equivalently, Q(θ,∆) must decrease. When ∆ increases further,
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Q(θ,∆) decreases and gets closer to zero, so that Q(θ,∆)∆ − k′(θ) eventually becomes
negative, that is, dθ
d∆ ≤ 0. The rest of the proof is similar to that in part (1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: According to Lemma 1, ∆ decreases in L given L ≤ D. Let L̂ be
such that
Lˆ =


Lˆ if ∆̂ = ∆(L̂) for L̂ ∈ (0, D)
D if ∆(D) ≥ ∆ˆ
0 if ∆(0) ≤ ∆ˆ
Then, when L < L̂, ∆(L) > ∆̂. Within this range, a higher liability L, through decreasing
∆, increases θ. Therefore, (1− θ)∆ decreases in L. According to condition (9), t−H(t) =
(1− θ)∆ , where t = F−1(1−Q), it then follows that Q(θ,∆) increases in L. In contrast,
if Lˆ < D, ∆(L) < ∆̂ when L > Lˆ, in which case θ(∆) decreases in L. We have L̂ = 0 if for
any L ≤ D, ∆(L) ≤ ∆(0) ≤ ∆̂ . Similarly, L̂ = D if for any L ≤ D, ∆(L) ≥ ∆(D) ≥ ∆̂.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: The firm’s optimal investment satisfies
max
θ
Q(θ,∆)[F−1(1−Q(θ,∆))− (1− θ)∆]− k(θ).
For any θ and Q, the objective function is higher with lower ∆. Therefore, the maximal
profit also decreases in ∆. When L = D, ∆ is the lowest and Π is the highest. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: The firm’s optimal output is determined by
t−
1− F (t)
f(t)
= t−H(t) = (1− θ)∆,
where t = F−1(1 − Q). The optimal quality investment θ satisfies either θ = θ or the
following condition
Q(θ,∆)∆− k′(θ) = 0
According to Proposition 1, when ∆ ≥ ∆̂, θ(∆) weakly decreases in ∆. Therefore, when
∆ increases, (1 − θ)∆ would increase. Correspondingly, Q(θ,∆) would decrease. When
∆ < ∆̂, θ(∆) increases in ∆ and therefore (1− θ)∆ may increase or decrease in ∆. Similar
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to the proof of Proposition 1, we have
Q′(θ,∆) = −f(t)
1− θ
1−H ′(t)
and
Q′θ(θ,∆) =
∆f(t)
1−H ′(t)
.
Therefore,
d[(1− θ)∆]
d∆
= (1− θ)−∆
dθ
d∆
= (1− θ) +∆
Q(θ,∆) +∆Q′(θ,∆)
∆Q′θ(θ,∆)− k
′′(θ)
= (1− θ) +∆
(1− F (t))−∆f(t) 1−θ1−H′(t)
∆2f(t)
1−H′(t) − k
′′(θ)
.
Note that the second order condition implies ∆Q′θ(θ,∆)− k
′′(θ) ≤ 0 for interior solutions.
Thus, (1− θ) +∆
(1−F (t))−∆f(t) 1−θ
1−H′(t)
∆2f(t)
1−H′(t)
−k′′(θ)
< 0 is equivalent to
∆(1− F (t))−∆2f(t)
1− θ
1−H ′(t)
> (1− θ)(k′′(θ)−
∆2f(t)
1−H ′(t)
), or
∆(1− F (t)) > (1− θ)k′′(θ).
Given
Q(θ,∆)∆− k′(θ) = 0,
the above condition becomes k′(θ) > (1−θ)k′′(θ). Therefore, as long as k′(θ) > (1−θ)k′′(θ),
d[(1−θ)∆]
d∆ < 0 so that Q(θ,∆) increases in ∆. If k
′′′(θ) ≤ 0, for any θ > 1/2, we have
k′(θ) ≥ θk′′(θ) > (1− θ)k′′(θ).
According to Proposition 1, when ∆ < ∆̂, θ increases in ∆. Therefore, since condition T1
holds, there exists a cut-off ∆˜ < ∆̂ such that θ > 1/2 when ∆ ∈ (∆˜, ∆̂]. Correspondingly,
Q(θ,∆) increases in ∆ when ∆ ∈ (∆˜, ∆̂]. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: According to Lemma 1, ∆ decreases in β and increases C and D.
Given C and β, there always exists D̂ such that ∆(L = D̂) = ∆̂. According to Proposition
1, ∆̂ > 0 and therefore D̂ > 0. Given condition T1, there exists D˜ such that∆(L = D˜) = ∆˜.
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Then If D ≥ D̂, ∆(L < D) > ∆(L = D) ≥ ∆̂. In this range, according to Lemma 4, U
decrease in ∆ and therefore consumer surplus is maximized under L = D. If D˜ ≤ D < D̂,
then ∆˜ ≤ ∆ < ∆̂. In this range, according to Lemma 4, U increase in ∆ and therefore
consumer surplus is maximized under L < D. The proof for part (2) and part (3) is similar
to the above. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, when D ≥ D̂, Propositions 2 and 3 imply that both
the firm and consumers prefer L = D. Therefore, full liability is socially optimal. In the
following analysis, suppose D < D̂.
Note that
dΠ
d∆
= −(1− θ)Q(θ,∆)
and
dU
d∆
=
dU
dt
dt
d∆
= −(1− F (t))
dt
d∆
= −Q(θ,∆)
dt
d∆
.
Given t− 1−F (t)
f(t) = t−H(t) = (1− θ)∆,
dt
d∆
=
1
1−H ′(t)
d[(1− θ)∆]
d∆
=
1
1−H ′(t)
{(1− θ)−∆
(1− F (t))−∆f(t) 1−θ1−H ′(t)
k′′(θ)− ∆
2f(t)
1−H′(t)
}.
Note that
∆(1− F (t)) = ∆Q(θ,∆) = k′(θ).
Then we have
dU
d∆
= Q(θ,∆){
k′(θ)−∆2f(t) 1−θ1−H′(t)
k′′(θ)(1−H ′(t))−∆2f(t)
−
1− θ
1−H ′(t)
}.
If dU
d∆ +
dΠ
d∆ > 0, then increasing ∆ would increase social welfare.
dU
d∆
+
dΠ
d∆
> 0
is equivalent to
k′(θ)−∆2f(t) 1−θ1−H′(t)
k′′(θ)(1−H ′(t))−∆2f(t)
−
1− θ
1−H ′(t)
> 1− θ.
The second order condition of (10)implies
k′′(θ)(1−H ′(t))−∆2f(t) > 0.
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Therefore, the above inequality is equivalent to
k′(θ) > (1− θ)k′′(θ)[2−H ′(t)]− (1− θ)∆2f(t).
If k′′′(θ) ≤ 0,for any θ > 2+h3+h ,
k′(θ) ≥ θk′′(θ) > (1− θ)k′′(θ)[2 + h]
≥ (1− θ)k′′(θ)[2−H′(t)] ≥ (1− θ)k′′(θ)[2−H ′(t)]− (1− θ)∆2f(t).
Therefore, given condition T2, there exists a non-empty set (∆′, ∆̂) such that, if ∆ ∈
(∆′, ∆̂), dU
d∆ +
dΠ
d∆ > 0. Since condition T2 implies condition T1 but the reverse might not
be true, it can be verified that ∆′ ≥ ∆˜, where ∆˜ is defined in Lemma 4. Given C and β,
define D′ such that ∆(L = D′) = ∆′. Then if D ≥ D̂, dU
dL
+ dΠ
dL
< 0; if D′ ≤ D < D̂,
dU
d∆ +
dΠ
d∆ > 0. The proof for parts (2) and (3) is similar to the above. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: According to Lemma 1, ∆ decreases in L when L ≤ D and
increases in L when L > D. Note that ∆(L = 0) =
∫ 1
0 γDdG(γ) > ∆(L = D). When L
goes to infinity, ∆(L → ∞) =
∫ 1
0 [βC + (1 − β)γD]dG(γ). (1) If
∫ 1
0 (C − γD)dG(γ) ≤ 0,
then ∆(L → ∞) ≤ ∆(L = 0).In this case, for any punitive damage compensation L > D,
there exists L′ < D such that ∆(L) = ∆(L′). (2) If
∫ 1
0 (C − γD)dG(γ) > 0, then ∆(L →
∞) > ∆(L = 0). Given continuity, there exists L > D such that ∆(L = L) = ∆(L = 0).
Therefore, for any L ∈ (D,L], there exists L′ < D such that ∆(L) = ∆(L′). Similar to
the proof for Proposition 4, if condition T2 holds, there exists a non-empty set (∆′, ∆̂)
such that, if ∆ ∈ (∆′, ∆̂), dU
d∆ +
dΠ
d∆ > 0. Note that, if L = 0, ∆ = E[γ]D. Define D
′′
as E[γ]D′′ = ∆′. Then according to Proposition 4, when D ∈ (D′,D′′), C ∈ (C ′, Ĉ), for
β ∈ (β̂, β′), ∆(L) ∈ (∆′, ∆̂) for any L ≤ D. Thus, ∆(L) ∈ (∆′, ∆̂) for any L ∈ (D,L]: since
dU
d∆ +
dΠ
d∆ > 0, L > L is socially more efficient than any L ≤ L. Q.E.D.
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